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GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
United States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Me. 1969)
Defendant Coles was a student at a Maine Job Corps center. Upon
returning overdue from a leave, defendant's suitcase was searched by
the Administrative Officer of the center. The search, which produced
marijuana, was not conducted pursuant to a search warrant, a valid
arrest or the defendant's consent.' The defendant, charged with
possession of narcotics, 2 made a timely motion to suppress the evidence
of the search, 3 claiming that the search violated his fourth amendment
rights.4 Held: motion to suppress denied. A warrantless search
conducted by a government employee who has statutory disciplinary
authority is valid even in the absence of probable cause to initiate the
search.
The court first pointed out that directors of Job Corps centers are
given statutory authority to discipline corpsmen in order to promote
proper moral and disciplinary standards at the. centersA The court
reasoned that the power to discipline encompassed the power to search.
And because it was the court, not the statute, which conferred the
power to search upon the Administrator, there was obviously no
statutory requirement that searches be conducted pursuant to a
warrant. Instead of reading in such a requirement to searches by the
Administrator, the court held that the Administrator had the authority
1. United States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Me. 1969). There is nothing in the opinion
to indicate that the Administrative Officer of the center had probable cause to make the search.
2. The defendant was charged with possession of narcotics in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 7, 13
(1964) and ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2362 (1964).
3. The defendant's motion to suppress is sanctioned under FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) (1964).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
5. United States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99, 101 (N.D. Me. 1969). 42 U.S.C. § 2720 (1968):
(a) Within Job Corps centers, standards of conduct and deportment shall be provided and
stringently enforced. In the case of violations committed by enrollees, dismissals from the
Corps or transfers to other locations shall be made in every instance where it is determined
that retention in the Corps, or in the particular Job Corps center, will jeopardize the
enforcement of such standards of conduct and deportment or diminish the opportunity of
other enrollees.
(b) In order to promote the proper moral and disciplinary conditions in the Job Corps,
the individual directors of Job Corps centers shall be given full authority to take
appropriate disciplinary measures against enrollees including, but not limited to, dismissal
from the Job Corps, subject to expeditious appeal procedures to higher authority, as
provided under regulations set by the Director.
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to conduct warrantless searches. The court then explicitly assumed that
the object of the search "was to determine whether contraband was
being brought to the Center," ' and implicitly assumed that the
introduction of marijuana into the center would deteriorate proper
moral and disciplinary standards.7 Thus, the court concluded that the
Administrative Officer's search was not only within the scope of his
disciplinary power, but actually mandated by his statutory authority to
discipline. Secondly, the court cited several cases to support the
proposition that a warrantless search conducted by a government
employee is not prohibited by the fourth amendment when the
government employee is charged with supervisory responsibility to
discipline subordinates or is authorized to make warrantless searches
by an appropriate regulation. 8
Searches conducted by law enforcement officers, which are
reasonable in scope, are valid under the fourth amendment when
conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable cause,9 as
incident to a lawful arrest, 10 with the consent of the defendant," in a
"hot pursuit" situation," or in an emergency situation.13 At the
opposite extreme are searches conducted by a private citizen. Courts
apply a blanket rule of validity to searches by private citizens when
initiated for personal reasons.' In between the polar cases of searches
6. United States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99, 103 (N.D. Me. 1969). The court also maintained
that "... it cannot be seriously maintained that the object of the search was to procure evidence
of a crime or in any way to facilitate an anticipated federal prosecution." Id. Belief that a search
will uncover contraband is quite obviously not the same as probable cause to initiate a search.
7. For discussion of the argument that discipline and order may not be adversely affected by
the introduction of marijuana, see 54 LA. L. REv. 618, 621 (1969).
8. United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960, rehearing
denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966); United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1964); Moore v.
Student Affairs Committee of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968); United
States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1967).
9. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
10. Id.
1I. Martinez v. United States, 333 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1964). Third party consent searches are
also valid under the fourth amendment in a limited set of circumstances. See Note, Third Party
Consent to Search and Seizure, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 12.
12. People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690,408 P.2d 365,47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
13. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
14. 19 STAN. L. REv. 608 (1967). See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Watson v.
United States, 391 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 985 (1969); Gold v. United
States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967); Barnes v. United States, 373 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1967).
However, searches conducted by a private citizen at the instigation of, or in participation with, a
law enforcement officer are not valid as searches by private citizens, but are tested by the
standards applicable to searches by law enforcement officers. Cf. Lowrey v. United States, 128
F 2d 477 (8th Cir. 1942); Fowler v. United States, 62 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1932).
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by law enforcement officers and by private citizens are searches by
government employees who cannot properly be classified as either law
enforcement officers or private citizens.'5
Decisions concerning government employee searches fall into two
groups. One group, upon which Coles relied, hold that government
employees may legally conduct a warrantless search when specifically
authorized by government regulation.' 6 The second group justifies
warrantless searches as a proper incident to the supervisory
responsibility to maintain discipline and security. 7
The typical regulation authorizing warrantless searches is directed to
those government employees with supervisory responsibilities, and is
justified as reasonably necessary in order that the supervisor maintain
discipline, order or security."8 It should be noted, however, that Camara
v. Municipal Court9 may have impliedly overruled the "regulation"
cases. In Camara, the Court held that municipal minimum standards
housing ordinances could not constitutionally provide for warrantless
administrative searches of apartment buildings by government health
inspectors.20 The court noted that "the basic purpose of this
amendment, . . . is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.'
Thus, the Court held that administrative searches must be conducted
pursuant to a civil warrant, but suggested that a standard of probable
cause less rigorous than that required to support a criminal search
warrant would justify issuance of a civil search warrant.2 The Camara
15. Oliver v. United States, 239 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1957)(a Postmaster); United States v.
Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1967) (a security officer in
the United States Mint); Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 623 (1926) (a social worker for the Welfare Dept.).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1964); Santana v. United States,
329 F.2d 854 (Ist Cir. 1964); Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State Univ., 284 F.
Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968); United States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 379
F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1967).
17. See note 36, infra.
18. United States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921, 924 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir.
1967).
19. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
20. In the companion case to Camara, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Court
held unconstitutional an ordinance providing for warrantless administrative searches of
commercial warehouses.
21. Camara v. Muncipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
22. Id. at 538-39.
Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts that would justify an
inference of "probable cause" to make an inspection are clearly different from those that
would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has been undertaken,
Id. at 538.
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decision recognizes that unwarranted intrusions by government officials
who cannot be strictly classified as law enforcement officers result in
just as much an invasion of the individual's privacy as warrantless
intrusions by law enforcement officers in search of criminal evidence
and, therefore, searches in both instances should be made pursuant to
a warrant.
Moreover, Camara noted that there may be constitutional exceptions
to the civil warrant requirement in administrative searches, just as there
are exceptions to the warrant requirement applicable to police
searches. = The Court suggested that prompt administrative inspections
may be lawfully conducted without a warrant in certain cases, such as
in an emergency situation.2 4 As a test whether or not a warrant is
required, the Court stated that:
I . . the question is not whether the public interest justifies the type of
search in question, but whether . . the burden of obtaining a warrant
is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.7s
Two of the "'regulation" cases cited by Coles were decided after
Camara," however, neither of those cases, nor Coles, discuss Camara.
Nevertheless, it would appear that Camara is applicable to government
employee searches,27 and in light of Camara, Coles' unquestioning
reliance on the "regulation" cases seems out of order.
Colonnade Catering Corporation v. United Statesul illustrates an
23. See People v. Flynn, noted in People v. Superior Court of the County of Butte, - Cal.
App. - 79 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1969), where the court in invalidating a warrantless search by a
postman stated that:
The thrust of the Fourth Amendment is not aimed solely at the police or law enforcement
agencies of the government; it is a guaranty against invasion by any governmental agency
of the right of privacy guaranteed therein.
Id. at 908 (emphasis added).
24 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
25. Id at 533.
26. Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala.
1968); United States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1967).
27. The ordinance in Camara provided for criminal penalties, and it might be suggested that
this distinguishes Camara from the "regulation" cases which do not set forth criminal penalties.
However, the Camara Court explicitly stated that:
We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is a
less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities
of crime. But we cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these
inspection cases are merely "peripheral." It is surely anomalous to say that the individual
and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the
individual is suspected of criminal bihavior.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
28. 410 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1969).
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application of Camara which, by analogy, might justify the result
reached by Coles. In Colonnade, inspectors of the Alcohol and
Tobacco Division of the Internal Revenue Service conducted a
warrantless search of defendant's premises and seized some unsealed
liquor and funnels which were allegedly being used to refill bottles in
violation of federal tax law. A federal regulation authorized the
warrantless inspection of certain documents required to be kept by
retail liquor dealers and any distilled spirits stored on the premises of
the dealer. 29 The defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the search
alleging that the. regulation was unconstitutional under Camara. The
court found that the proper test of the validity of warrantless searches
under Camara was whether the objectives sought to be achieved by a
warrantless search would be frustrated if the inspectors were required
to obtain a warrant." The court took notice that taxes or distilled
spirits are an essential part of the national revenue, and that a common
method of evading such taxes is refilling the liquor bottles.3' Thus the
court concluded that there is a substantial public interest compelling
periodic inspection of the premises of liquor dealers. The court also
took notice that efforts in the 1920's to enforce the eighteenth
amendment were frequently ineffectual because the liquor dealer could
quickly dispose of illegally bottled liquor during the time the inspector
delayed in acquiring and presenting a warrant.3 2 Thus the court found
that surprise was an important element in liquor violations inspections.
The court pointed out that the regulation authorizing warrantless
inspections limited such inspections to normal business hours, and
authorized inspection only of certain business records required to be
kept and any distilled spirits stored on the premises.3 Unlike the broad
statutory authorization in Camara, the Colonnade regulation, the court
concluded, was limited in scope so as to provide protection against
excessive intrusion upon the individual's privacy.u In the balance, the
court found that the governmental purpose in collecting excise taxes on
distilled spirits would be frustrated if liquor inspectors were required
to obtain warrants, and therefore upheld the regulation as
constitutional under Camara.3 In that it recognizes the various interests
29. 26 U.S.C. § 5146(b) (1964).
30. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 410 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1969).
31. Id. at 202-03.
32. Id. at 203.
33. Id. at 201.
34. Id. at 201-02.
35. Id. at 200.
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to be weighed in regulation justified searches, Colonnade represents an
improvement over the rubber stamp reasoning of Coles.
The second group of cases in the government employee search areas
hold that government employees charged with supervisory duties may
validly conduct a warrantless search of subordinates as incident to the
supervisory responsibility to maintain discipline and order.36 These
decisions, as the "regulation" cases, fail to consider the impact of the
governmental intrusion into the individual's right of privacy. While it
may be true in certain instances that a government employee-supervisor
needs to make an immediate and warrantless search in order to
maintain proper standards of discipline and order, the supervisor status
is not worthy of being elevated to a constitutional standard for all
cases. The fact that a government employee is also the supervisor of
an individual searched does not ameliorate the governmental invasion
of privacy, nor does it demand that a search to be conducted
immediately and without a warrant in all circumstances. Therefore, it
is suggested that Camara applies to searches by government employees
who are charged with supervisory duties. This means that searches by
government employee-supervisors must be conducted pursuant to
search warrants unless the nature of the situation is such that the
burden of obtaining a warrant would be likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose for initiating the search.3 7 In addition, as
Camara suggested that a warrant to make an administrative search
may be issued on less than probable cause to issue a criminal search
warrant, it may be appropriate in the government employee-supervisor
situation to issue a search warrant on less than criminal probable
cause. At the very least, it should be recognized that, if the fourth
amendment is to protect the individual against unreasonable
governmental invasion of privacy, supervisory authority alone is not
enough to sanction all warrantless searches.
The Coles court reasoned that because the Administrative Officer of
the center had statutory authority to discipline corpsmen, he had the
authority to conduct warrantless searches.18 It is questionable whether
disciplinary authority includes authority to conduct warrantless
36. See. e.g.. United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960 (1965),
rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966), United States v. Miller, 261 F. Supp. 442 (D. Del. 1966);
People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360,229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
37 See note 25, supra, and accompanying text.
38. United States v. Coles, 302 F. Slipp. 99, 102 (N.D. Me. 1969).
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searches. A common definition of "discipline" is: ". . . retribution for
an offense, especially in a subordinate. ' ' 39 The search which Coles
classified as an appropriate disciplinary measure was conducted before
any disciplinary infraction was discovered. Thus it could be argued that
the search of the defendant's suitcase was beyond the Administrator's
statutory disciplinary authority.
Moreover, in each of the cases which Coles cited as authority for the
proposition that a government employee with supervisory responsibility
may legally conduct a warrantless search of subordinates in order to
maintain discipline and order, there was at least probable cause for
initiating the search." There is not the slightest indication in Coles that
there was probable cause to search defendant's suitcase. By
disregarding this fact, Coles virtually destroys any protection the
individual may have had against warrantless searches by government
employees.
39. Local 23393, AFL v. American Can Co., 28 N.J. Super. 306, 199 A.2d 693 (1953).
40. See note 8, supra.
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